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SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNDER TITLE VII:
THE LINE OF DEMARCATION BETWEEN SEX AND
SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION
Nicholas Hua*
"Once [you] begin the dance of legislation.., you must struggle
through its mazes as best you can to its breathless end-if any there
be."
-Former President Woodrow Wilsoni

I.

INTRODUCTION

The physical, sexual, and verbal psychological abuse inflicted
2
upon men has long been ignored as a form of gender discrimination.
Only recently in Oncale v. Sundowner Offihore Services, Inc.3 the
United States Supreme Court recognized that males could bring a
sexual harassment claim against other males to remedy this type of
abuse. 4 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment
discrimination through sexual harassment to the extent that the
harassment occurs "because of sex"-not because of sexual
orientation.5 Title VII thus turns6 on the meaning and implication of
what constitutes "because of sex.",

* Senior Articles Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 43. J.D. Candidate, Santa
Clara University School of Law; B.A., University of California, Berkeley.
1. See John M. Kernochan, Statutory Interpretation: An Outline of Method, 3 THE
DALHOUSIE L. J. 333 (1976), quoting WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT
195 (Meridian Books ed., 1885 & 1956).
2. See Hilary S. Axam & Deborah Zalesne, Simulated Sodomy and Other Forms of
Heterosexual "Horseplay": Same Sex Sexual Harassment, Workplace Gender Hierarchies,
and the Myth of the Gender Monolith Before and After Oncale, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
155, 157 (1999).
3. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
4. See id
5. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703 (a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
6. This comment uses "sex" interchangeably with "gender." Where the meaning of
"sex" differs, the change of terminology and interpretation will be duly noted.
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The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the
courts that examine same-sex sexual harassment claims have struggled
for years to define the meaning of "because of sex" in Title VII.7 The
overlapping nature of sex, sexual orientation, and sexuality further
complicates the task of distinguishing whether and in what
circumstances verbal and/or physical harassment are motivated by
"sex" rather than by "sexual orientation.",8
From August through November 1991, Joseph Oncale suffered a
series of assaults and batteries caused by coworkers and supervisors
who threatened to "f... [him] in the behind." 9 The final harassment
occurred in the shower where they attempted to force a bar of soap in
his anus while threatening to rape him.'0 When Oncale reported these
incidents to the Safety Compliance Clerk," Oncale was told that the
clerk had also been "'picked [on... ]' and was called a name
suggesting homosexuality.' ' 12 The clerk's comment indicates that
Oncale's harassers targeted him, at least in part, because of his sexual
orientation or perceived homosexuality. 13
The Supreme Court,
however, attributed the provocation to Oncale's gender rather than his

7. See ERNEST C. HADLEY & GEORGE M. CHUZI, SEXUAL HARASSMENT: FEDERAL
LAW, Chap. 3.1.B.10 (1997 ed.). For the proposition that the EEOC has been unclear on its
stance on same-sex sexual harassment, compare Campbell v. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., 01831816 (1983) and Machinik v. Veterans Admin., 01882988 (1988) (EEOC cases
reinforcing the notion that males are not within the purview of Title VII discrimination
because of sex) with DePaul v. Postmaster Gen., 01912729 (1992) (stating that the EEOC
disagrees with the position that coworker's conduct was not based on sex).
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a), the modem regulatory guidelines of the EEOC, tend to

support same-sex sexual harassment claims:
(a) Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of §703 of Title VII.
Unwelcome sexual advances, request for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical contact of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1)
submission to such conduct is made either implicitly or explicitly a term or
condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of
such conduct by an individual is used as a basis for employment decisions
affecting such individual, (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment.
Id.

8. See Axam, supra note 2, at 240. Because sex shares an "epiphenomenal
relationship to gender," every sex discrimination case is "grounded in normative gender
rules and roles." See id.
9. Petitioner's Brief at 4, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75

(1998)(No. 96-568) (alteration in original).
10. See id

11.See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 77.
12. See id
13. See id.
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sexual orientation, holding that the harassment must meet the statutory
requirement--"because of sex." 14

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Rene v. MGM GrandHotel,
Inc. 5 reviewed facts similar to those in Oncale, yet reached a contrary
result. 16 Rene's male supervisor and male coworkers inserted their
fingers into his anus through his clothes, grabbed his crotch, caressed
'' 7
his face, and touched his body "like they would do to a woman.

They even called him "sweetheart" and muheca, Spanish for female
doll. 8 Despite the dual influences of gender and sexual orientation
belief that he
harassment, the Court found persuasive Rene's subjective
9

was harassed for his sexual orientation as a gay man.'

Absent Rene's admission, the only thing certain with such a
subjective standard is its lack of certainty and guidance in determining
when the sexual harassment is triggered by Title VII's "because of
sex." This uncertainty will continue to confuse the courts and create

apprehension in the workplace between employer and employee, who
are left wondering whether to seek redress or pursue affirmative or
remedial action. 20 Although the decision in Oncale settled the issue
that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII, Justice

Scalia's "cryptic ',2' and carefully crafted language sought to avoid a
14. See id. at 80.
15. See Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 243 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 305
F.3d 1061 (2002) (en banc).
16. See id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 1210. Rene stated in his deposition that he was harassed for being openly
out at work. If Rene had honestly believed that being called a female doll and being touched
like a woman demonstrated his harassers' intent to harass him because of his gender, it is
it
not clear whether the court would find the conduct violative of "because of sex." Were
the case that Oncale believed he was harassed for being gay, despite contrary evidence
suggesting otherwise, the subjective belief test for satisfying Title VII's "because of sex" is
far from leading to a satisfying result. This test in Rene seems inconsistent to the founding
principles of Title VII. See discussion infra Part I.
20. See generally Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79. In the context of a "'hostile work
environment' sexual harassment claim, the state and federal courts have taken a
"bewildering variety of stances." Id. For instance, in the Fifth Circuit, it is a per se rule that
any occurrence of same-sex sexual harassment claims is unenforceable under Title VII. See
Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988). There are other decisions that
permit such claims only if the plaintiff can prove that the harasser was motivated by sexual
desire on the part of the harasser. See generally McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of
Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996) and Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., 99 F.3d 138
(4th Cir. 1996). Still, other courts suggest that workplace harassment, sexual in nature, is
always actionable, regardless of sex, sexual orientation or motivations.
21. See Richard Storrow, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Claims After Oncale: Defining
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gender non-conformity theory and "embraced a sexual desire theory of
causation. 22
Part II of this comment evaluates same-sex sexual harassment
cases in the federal courts of appeals and attempts to untangle the web
of confusion over the meaning of Title VII's prohibition against
discrimination "because of sex." 23 This comment argues that the
central source of confusion in same-sex sexual harassment cannot be
resolved by requiring victims to prove causation through the harasser's
sexual desire for the plaintiff.24 Sexual desire is grounded in remnants
of traditional opposite-sex sexual harassment, and is inadequate as a
standard to distinguish such a dichotomy.25 Part II explores the
historical contours of sexual harassment lawsuits, which led to the
enactment of Title VII; 26 analyzes statutory interpretation of Title VII
as applied to race and pregnancy discrimination; 27 and examines the
Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), California's own version
of a modified Title VII. 28 Since so many courts are entrenched in
confusion, it is important to discuss the nexus between sex and sexual
orientation from a scientific perspective. 29 As Part II delineates,
without manageable guidelines leading to lucidity in "sex"
discrimination, confusion will continue to reign in same-sex sexual
harassment cases.3 ° Part IV offers an analysis of the ongoing confusion
caused by treating gender-based harassment and sexual orientationbased harassment as two distinct and separate doctrines. 3 ' Lastly, Part
V proposes that the current test for determining same-sex sexual
harassment, although helpful in limited instances, is insufficient to
guide the courts out of this confusion, and thus should be abandoned in
favor of a clearer standard.3 2

the Boundaries of Actionable Conduct, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 677 (1998). See also Marianne
C. Delpo, The Thin Line Between Love and Hate: Same-Sex Hostile-Environment Sexual
Harassment, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (1999) (stating that interpretation of same-sex
sexual harassment continues to befuddle the courts one year after Oncale).
22. David S. Schwartz, When Is Sex Because of Sex? The CausationProblem In Sexual
HarassmentLaw, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1702 (2002).
23. See discussion infra Part It.
24. See discussion infra Part IV.
25. See discussion infra Part IV.
26. See discussion infra Part II.
27. See discussion infra Part II.A.2-A.3.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See discussion
See discussion
See discussion
See discussion
See discussion

infra Part II.A.4.
infra Part II.C.
infra Part III.
infra Part IV.
infra Part V.
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II.

BACKGROUND

Courts in the past two decades have witnessed an explosion of
diverse sexual harassment claims in the workplace.33 No longer is
sexual harassment confined strictly to the realm of male-female
interactions, where a female is victimized by a male.34 Last year, over
2,000 claims of sexual harassment reported to the EEOC were filed by
men, and this figure has been steadily on the rise since the early
1990s. 35 Surprisingly, the number of same-sex sexual harassment cases
surpassed opposite-sex sexual harassment cases in published decisions
in 2001.36
Unlike traditional claims of sexual harassment involving offensive
interactions between women and men, recent same-sex sexual
harassment cases are often very complex and raise different issues than
earlier courts' analyses of "traditionally defined" sexual harassment
cases. 37 In its statutory interpretation, a court must determine when the
harassing conduct can be classified as sex discrimination or when it is a
product of sexual orientation discrimination. 38 Because federal courts

33. See Deborah Zalesne, When Men HarassMen: Is It Sexual Harassment?,7 TEMP.
POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 395 (1998).
34. See id.
35. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Sexual Harassment
Charges EEOC & FEPA 's Combined: FY 1992-FY 2000, available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/harass.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2001) [hereinafter EEOC

Statistics]. Of the 15,836 sexual harassment claims filed in 2000 with the EEOC, 2,154
comprised of claims by men (13.6%). Id. In contrast, of the 10,532 claims in 1992, 958
were from men (9.1%). Id. Unfortunately, these claims do not reflect whether the harasser
was of the same gender. See also HADLEY & CHUZI, supra note 7. "Most of the cases
involving allegations of same sex harassment to reach the courts and EEOC have involved

men." Id.
36. In 2001, the federal dockets contained nineteen sexual harassment cases, twelve of
which involved same-sex sexual harassment claims. See Ciccotto v. LCOR, Inc., 2001 WL
1606705, (S.D.N.Y. 2001); EEOC v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498 (6th Cir. 2001);
Bibby v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2001); Nichols v.
Azteca Rest. Enter., Inc. 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001); See Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc.,

243 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 305 F.3d 1061 (2002) (en banc); Morris v. Lee, No.
Civ.A. 98-1656 (E.D. La. 2001); Wanchik v. Great Lakes Health Plan, Inc., No. 99-2333,
2001 WL 223742 (6th Cir.); Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843
(2001); Cooper Indus., Inc., v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001); Mota v.
Univ. of Texas Houston Health Sci. Ctr., 261 F.3d 512 (5th Cir. 2001); Cooke v. Stefani
Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 250 F.3d 564 (7th Cir. 2001); Bianchi v. City of Philadelphia, 767 A.2d
31 (3d Cir. 2001) (unpublished opinion).
37. See also discussion infra Part IV.
38. See Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Med. Ctr., 570 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1978); Holloway
v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977); Powell v. Read's, Inc., 436 F.
Supp. 369 (D. Md. 1977) (early cases equating sex to gender). Compare McWilliams v.
Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996) with Wrighton v. Pizza Hut
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of appeals confronted with same-sex sexual harassment disputes have
for years been struggling with the "because of sex" terminology, it is
important to return to the original statutory language and the legislative
history surrounding Title VII, before venturing into recent federal case
law.39
Prior to the enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
civil rights administrative agencies were entrusted with the
responsibility of evaluating complaints of alleged discrimination.4 ° In
reviewing potential civil rights violations, these agencies regarded
themselves as mediators between employers and employees. 4'
Although strong public policy concerns urged the eradication of
discrimination in the workplace, the agencies often failed to act on
behalf of the employees' best interests. 42 The only positive outcome of
the agencies' inability to protect the rights of employees was the
enactment of Title VII, which led to the establishment of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).43
A.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 covers various "Titles" or areas of
anti-discrimination law.44 Title VII, otherwise known as title 42 U.S.C.
section 2000e governs fair employment practices at the federal level,
declaring it unlawful to discharge or fail to hire an individual on the
basis of certain proscribed classifications.4 5 In relevant part, it states:
It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or
of Am., 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996).
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 governs
employment discrimination law.
40. See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM & AMERICAN LAW § 12.5.1 (4th ed. 2000).
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. The EEOC is an executive agency that is empowered to receive, file, and
investigate complaints of discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4, e-5(b). Title VII was
subsequently amended in 1972 to enable the EEOC to bring suit in federal court to remedy

discrimination after attempts at mediation and conciliation proved ineffective. See also 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g)(discussion of special powers and authorities of the EEOC).
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
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(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because
of such individual's race,
46
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
While the statutory language appears clear, ascertaining which

classifications fall within the definition of "race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin" is not a simple feat.47 Within the area of sex
discrimination specifically, one jurist commented that the intricacies of

"'sex' [are] not straightforward" and there is a multitude of questions
surrounding its meaning.48 Prior to reviewing the evidence in the case,
the same jurist had the preconceived notion, as do many judges, that
sex is merely a "matter of whether you are [born] male or female. 49

Understanding the ways in which "sex" is ascribed would prove
beneficial to lower courts and employers attempting to distinguish
between harassment involving sexual orientation and harassment based
on gender. 50 To understand the connection between sex and sexual
orientation, an appropriate discussion reviews how legal protections
against "sex" discrimination
52
subsequent legislation.

emerged 5 1 and were

clarified

by

1. The OriginalLegislation
There were several congressional attempts to pass a civil rights

46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. (emphasis added). Parts (a), (b), and (c) of Section 703
prohibit discrimination "because of ... race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
Discrimination unrelated to these factors or that involves classifications other than race,
color, religion, sex or national origin will not violate this statute. See Pollard v. Rea Magnet
Wire Co., Inc., 824 F.2d 557, 560 (7th Cir. 1987) ("No matter how medieval a firm's
practices, no matter how high-handed its decisional process, no matter how mistaken the
firm's managers, Title VII ...do[es] not interfere.").
47. MACK A. PLAYER ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES AND
MATERIALS 23 (2d ed. 1995).
48. Ulane v. E.Airlines, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 821, 823 (1983), rev'd, 742 F.2d 1081 (7th
Cir. 1984).
49. See id.
50. See discussion infra Part IV.
51. After a discussion of the legislative history, this comment will examine how courts
interpret the meaning of "sex" for the purpose of Title VII.
52. Title VII has been amended four times since its initial appearance on the statute; the
most relevant for this discussion is the 1978 amendment, known as the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act.
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package aimed specifically at targeting discrimination against racial
The key players were mainly in the Kennedy
minorities.5 3
54
After a series of extensive revisions by the House
Administration.
Judiciary Committee, one of the administration's proposals was
submitted for debate on the House floor." There, Representative
Howard Smith, a Democrat from Virginia and the Chair of the House
Rules Committee, suggested the addition of protection for victims of
sex discrimination.5 6 The purpose of his amendment was to defeat the
57
entire legislation by attempting to cast it as an absurd proposition.
Despite his effort, the bill as amended survived the debate without any
of sex" and its
substantive discussion about the meaning of "because
58
potential effects on workplace sexual harassment.
While the drafters of Title VII had fair employment practices in
mind, they apparently did not anticipate that the prohibition against
"sex" discrimination would cause so much tension in sexual
harassment cases, let alone same-sex sexual harassment.5 9 Only House
Representative Edith Green, a Democrat from Oregon, expressed some
misgivings with the quick enactment of Title VII into law.60
Representative Green cautioned that "there will be problems for
businesses [and] for managers.,' 6 1 Her warning, however, was not
specific enough or sufficient to warrant further discussion over the
62
meaning of "sex" and its relevance to same-sex sexual harassment.
Although women reaped economic and social benefits from the
legislative carelessness in Title VII, the impulsive lawmaking on the
part of Congress in the area of "sex" discrimination has left this term as
53. See PLAYER ET AL., supra note 47, at 24
54. See id.(citing H.R. 7152 (1993).
55. 110 CONG. REC. 2577-84 (1964).
56. See id.
57. See id. See also Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984)
("This sex amendment was abruptly added to the statute's prohibition against racial
discrimination ...[as a] ploy seeking to 'scuttle the adoption of the Civil Rights Act."').
58. See id.
59. See 110 CONG. REC. 2577-84 (1964). The weight of the discussion of Title VII
centered on racial discrimination. Even a bare mention of same-sex sexual harassment is
conspicuously lacking in the legislative history since the naming of the injury of sexual
harassment emerged during the 1970s. See Delpo, supra note 21.
60. See CONG. Q. ALMANAC, 88th Cong. 2d Sess. 338, 348 (1964). As the only female
member to oppose the amendment, Representative Green also stated that "this is not the
time or place for adding sex to Title VII's list of discrimination." Id.
61. See id. Some commentators speculated that the "problems" Representative Green
was referring to concerned sexual harassment in the workplace. See Susan Estrich, Sex at
Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 816-17 (1991) ("[Title VII's] opponents include a number of
Congressmen who hoped that the inclusion of 'sex' would highlight the absurdity of the
effort as a whole, and contribute to its defeat.").
62. See Estrich supra note 61, at 813.
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one of the most troubling and difficult to define.63 According to a
report on the proposed legislation, no member of Congress submitted
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for debate or review in any of the House
subcommittees.

64

Sexual harassment as a legal concept never existed prior to the
1970s. 65 The omission in the wording of Title VII, according to a
literalist interpretation, means that Congressional silence permits
invidious and arbitrary discrimination in the workplace to escape
federal protection.66 Title VII, however, is chiefly concerned with the
"imbalance of power" between employers and employees and the
misuse of that power.67 In sexual harassment disputes, Title VII is
intended to protect employees from being subjected to a hostile work
environment and from the pressures of sexual demands by those in
powerful positions. 68 The rationale is that employees in subordinate
positions are unwilling to succumb to such pressures but are
unfortunately powerless to counter them if the employees wish to
preserve their employment. 69 Where anti-discrimination law affords
such protection, the employees should not have to face an ultimatum
between choosing employment and enduring the harassment.

The need for federal protection becomes apparent in light of the
confusion in the federal courts. Congress made two attempts to pass
the Civil Rights Act prior to 1964. 7 0 The provision "because of sex" in
63. This lack of legislative substance left courts unguided as to what Title VII meant by
"because of sex." Title VII also failed to provide a list of offenses or employment actions
that would violate the statute.
64. 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEWS 2355, 2431 (1964).
65. See Delpo, supra note 21, at 2 (Sexual harassment as a phrase was first coined by
the EEOC in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1996): "(a) Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation
of section 703 of Title VII .... (b) In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes
sexual harassment, the Commission will look at ... the totality of the circumstances, such
as the nature of the sexual advances and the context in which the incident occurred."). Part
of the confusion with the administrative promulgation is that it is silent on same-sex sexual
harassment.
66. For an illustration of a literalist reading of same-sex sexual harassment, see, e.g.,
Susan P. Woodhouse, Same-Gender Sexual Harassment: Is It Sex Discrimination Under
Title VII?, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1147 (1996).
67. Note, Sexual HarassmentClaims ofAbusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97
HARV. L. REv. 1449, 1451-52 (1984).
68. See id.
69. See id. at 1455 (emphasis added). See also Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798
F.2d 210, 213 (7th Cir. 1986). In effect, the actions of the harasser, indicated by words or
actions, makes the statement that the victim is inferior because of his sex.
70. See 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEWS, supranote 64, at 2426.
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Title VII withstood revision from Congress until 1978, when "sex" was
expanded to include employment decisions71motivated by "pregnancy,
childbirth, or medically related conditions."
2.

The PregnancyDiscriminationAct of 1978

Prior to 1978,72 it was legally permissible for an employer to
refuse to hire women on the basis of pregnancy or motherhood. 73 The
original language of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not
sex." 74
prohibit discrimination because of pregnancy, only "because of
Although biology dictates that one sex bears the burden of pregnancy
and childbirth, pregnancy discrimination as a form of sex
discrimination was not specifically recognized in the original text of
Title VII. 75 However, the resulting unequal employment relationship
between women and men can be seen as early as the late 1960s and
remains a reality today. Prior to the 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination
Aci, which statutorily amended Title VII, courts confined to a literal
reading of Title VII enabled employers to use pregnancy or childbirth
as reasonable grounds to terminate the employment relationship,
denying women equal employment opportunities. 76 In circumstances
where employers used pregnancy as a pretext for invidious sex
discrimination against women, a literal interpretation of Title VII
meant no protection for women.77

71. See Desantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
72. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 amended Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 in 92 STAT. 2076. Title VII has also been amended in 1972, 1991, and 1995.
73. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
74. See id.
75. 78 STAT. 253 (1964).
76. If an employer denies employment to women with preschool age children but not
men with pre-school age children, this may constitute discrimination on the basis of sex
rather than any one with preschool age children. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400
U.S. 542 (1971) (holding that familial status based on preschool-age children is not a
protected class under Title VII.).
77. The background wherein pregnancy discrimination against women arose serves as
an impetus and forceful public policy consideration to ameliorate the plight of women as a
group, who has been sheltered from maximizing the bread-winning experiences that men
have long relished.
Title 42 U.S.C. section 2000e-(k) states that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
"shall not require an employer to pay for health insurance benefits for abortion, except

where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term, or except
where medical complications have arisen from an abortion." Id. However, the provision of
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act will be subject to the terms and conditions stated in a
bona fide collective bargaining agreement regarding abortion. Id.
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Dissatisfied with the predicament of this outcome and a literal
reading of "sex" discrimination, Congress passed the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act and added section 701(k) into Title VII. 78 Title 42
U.S.C. section 2000e-(k) presents an expansive reading of "because of
sex" and sets forth additional definitions of "sex," in pertinent part, as
follows:
(k) The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but
are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated
the same for all employment-related purposes.. .79
Employment decisions that were once based on so-called neutral
"factors other than sex," such as "pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions" are now proscribed considerations, no longer
immune from a Title VII challenge. 80 Even when benign factors-such
as a desire to protect unborn children from lead poisoning-are used to
rationalize an employment practice that shelters and isolates women
from certain positions in the workplace, a violation of Title VII has
occurred.8 1 In such cases, the violation is not as a result of the original
legislation in 1964, but "by reason of the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act. 82
3.

The Parr Expansive Reading of Title VII "Because of Race"

Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Insurance Society83 contains
an important analytical tool for understanding prior court confusion in
reviewing the Title VII classification against racial discrimination. 84 In
78. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(k).
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (Scalia,
J., concurring).
82. For further discussion of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, see supranotes 74, 7881 and accompanying text.
83. See Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y, 791 F.2d 888, 890 (11th Cir.
1986).
84. See Celia M. Ruiz, Legal Standards Regarding Gender Equity and Affirmative
Action, 100 EDUC. LAW REP. 841 (1995). Some courts even analogized "reverse
discrimination" to same-sex sexual harassment. See EEOC v. Walden Books Co., 885 F.
Supp. 1100 (M.D. Tenn. 1995) andEaston v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 905 F.Supp. 1368
(C.D. Ca. 1995). However, to understand the root of the problem in statutory confusion in
"because of sex," it is best to begin that inquiry with a discussion of how courts have
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order to supplement a legislative omission that is a material term of the
statute, it is clear that the court did not strictly interpret "because of
race" in Parrto find the employer improperly used racial consideration
in its employment decision. In Parr,an insurance company refused to
hire a salesperson, not because of his race (white), but because of his
marriage to an African-American woman. 5 Just as confusion over the
meaning of "because of sex" currently divides federal courts along
political lines, many courts in the past have long struggled
with how to
86
analyze "because of race" and have "gone both ways."
In determining what is or should be a protected class under Title
VII, the court held that "it makes no difference whether the plaintiff
specifically alleged in his complaint that he has been discriminated
against because of his race." 87 To the extent that racial classification
was improperly used by the employer, the court in Parrbelieved race
to be so interrelated to the identity of the person discriminated against
that "it would be a folly" not to read Title VII broadly and find a
violation.8 8
Since the court's expansion of Title VII in Parr, employment
practices that discriminate against an individual's relationship with
another person because of that person's particular race are prohibited
"associational" discrimination. 89

4.

Title VII and California'sFairEmployment and HousingAct

State legislatures seeking to curb sexual harassment in the
workplace generally look to federal statutes and case law for guidance

interpreted other Title VII "because of' classifications.
85. See Parr, 791 F.2d at 890.
86. See id. See Ripp v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 205 (N.D. Ala. 1973) (The
Court stressed that Title VII prohibits discrimination against an individual because of "such
individual's race," and that the "plaintiff makes no complaint that he has suffered any
detriment on account of his race."). See also Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh Day
Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding that white woman discharged for
having a social relationship with an African-American man stated a claim for discrimination
under Title VII-because of race).
87. See Parr, 791 F.2d at 892.
88. See id.
89. See id. If discrimination stems as a result of the discriminated person's race, there
is a direct nexus between the defendant's discriminatory conduct giving rise to the harm to
the plaintiff. If the discrimination stems not directly but rather in relations, or from persons
closely associated with plaintiff, the discrimination may also violate Title VII.
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in structuring their anti-discrimination statutes. 90 Currently, at least
sixteen states have enacted some form of legislation dealing with samesex sexual harassment. 91 In drawing the boundaries of actionable
same-sex sexual harassment claims, states like California were
cognizant of the limitations of Title VII and its failure to extend
protection for sexual orientation discrimination.92
California and federal law alike prohibit discrimination in the
workplace and have identified sexual harassment as an unlawful
employment practice.93 Both California and federal statutes recognize
"6sex" as a protected class, but only California's Fair Employment and
Housing Act (FEHA) extends protection on the basis of "sexual
orientation." 94 Section 129400)(1) of the California Government
Code, also known as the FEHA, provides that it shall be unlawful:
For an employer ... because of race, religious creed, color,
national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability,
medical condition, marital status, sex, age, or sexual orientation,to
harass an employee, an applicant, or a person providing services
pursuant to a contract. Harassment of an employee shall be
unlawful if the entity, or its agents or supervisors, knows or should
have known of this conduct and fails to take immediate and
appropriate corrective action. An entity shall
take all reasonable
95
steps to prevent harassment from occurring.

Similar to federal law, California recognizes two theories of
90. See Norma Rotunno, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Under State AntiDiscriminationLaws, 73 A.L.R. 1(5th ed. 1999).
91. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1461 (West 2002); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 129400)(1)
(West 2002); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.10(1)(a) (West 2002); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§
5/1-5/101. (West 2002); IOWA CODE § 216 (West 2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1001 et
seq. (West 2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 5 §§ 4551-4554 (West 2002); MASS. GEN.
LAWS. Ch. 151B §§ 1(18), 4(16A), 9 (West 2002); MICH. COP. LAWS §§ 37.2102(1),
37.2103(h) (West 2002); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 3.548 (103)(h), (b) (West 2002); MINN.
STAT. ANN.§§ 363.01(10)(a)(3), (14), 363.03(1), (2), 480(a).08(3) (West 2002); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 10:5-1 through 10:5-42, 10:5-5(hh), 10:5-12 (West 2002); N.Y. EXEC. LAWS §
296(1); N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-107(1), 296(a), 296-a. (West 2002); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 4112-4112.02 (West 2002); PA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 43 § 951 (West 2002);
WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.180(3) (West 2002); W. VA. CODE §§ 5-11-1 through 5-11-20
(West 2002). See also Rotunno, supra note 90 (state-by-state discussion of antidiscrimination statutes).
92. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 129400)(1) (the sexual harassment component of
California's Fair Employment and Housing Act, which expressly includes sexual orientation
discrimination.).
93. Cf 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(k) with CAL. GOV'T CODE § 129400)(1).
94. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12900 et seq.
95. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940 (j)(1). (emphasis added).
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96
sexual harassment: quid pro quo and hostile work environment.
Under the hostile work environment theory, sexual harassment in the
workplace is a form of sex discrimination that alters the "terms,
conditions, or privileges" of employment by creating a hostile,
offensive, or intimidating work environment. 97 An employer tolerating
sexual harassment against its employees is deemed to have adversely
altered the terms of the employment relationship in violation of Title
VII and the FEHA, 98 because tangible employment loss need not
include the loss of a job, income, or cause the victim actual physical
injury in order for sexual harassment to violate Title VII. 99
Under the FEHA, common law agency doctrines do not bar an
employee from bringing a claim against the employer based on
coworker harassment, even if the supervisor has no knowledge, actual
or constructive, of the harassment.'0 0 The FEHA is unique in that the
"focus of [its] cause of action ... is whether the victim has been
subjected to sexual harassment" instead of overemphasizing the
motivation of the harasser. 0 1 The intent of the California Legislature
was to construe "gender" liberally to include "harassment between
males," requiring only a showing that the work environment is
sufficiently severe, hostile, and abusive-thereby departing from the

96. This comment explores only hostile work environment claims. The other type of
sexual harassment claim is quid pro quo, which occurs when job benefits are conditioned in
exchange for acquiescence to requests for sexual favors. See Mogilefsky v. Superior Court,
20 Cal. App. 4th 1409 (1993) (substantive analysis of Cal. Gov't Code § 129400)(1)).
97. See Swenson v. Potter, 2001 WL 33653935, n.5 (9th Cir. 2001) ("We used the term
'hostile work environment' only as a threshold indicator of the type of harassment alleged
(i.e., as opposed to quid pro quo harassment."). See also, Priest v. Rotary, 634 F. Supp. 571
(N.D. Cal. 1986). It is quid pro quo sexual harassment where job benefits or conditions are
offered to employees for acquiescence to an employer's request for sexual favors. See, e.g.,
Collins v. Baptist Mem'l Geriatric Ctr., 937 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1991).
98. See Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 923 (9th Cir. 2000).
99. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) ("The language of Title
VII is not limited to 'economic' or 'tangible' discrimination. The phrase 'terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment' evinces a congressional intent 'to strike at the entire spectrum
of disparate treatment.').
100. See CAL. GOv'T CODE § 12940(j)(3) (making supervisor and employee personally
liable for their harassing conduct regardless if the employer or covered entity knew or
should have known of the conduct and failed to take corrective measures to remedy the
harassment against the victim).
101. See Mogilefsky, 20 Cal. App. 4th at 1418. The FEHA in many respects goes
beyond offering more protection against sexual harassment than in Title VII. The list of
protected classes is far more extensive than under Title VII. California has a public policy
to "protect and safeguard the right and opportunity of all persons to seek, obtain, and hold
employment without discrimination or abridgement on account of race, religious creed,
color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical conditions,
marital status, sex, age or sexual orientation." See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12920. The entire
country should have such a public policy as that of California.
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amorphous Title VII standard of "because of sex."'

02

Recent FederalCases Interpreting "Because of Sex"
The current split in Ninth Circuit case law on same-sex sexual
harassment has stirred substantial confusion as to how DeSantis v.
Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., Inc. 103 should be understood and
same-sex sexual harassment can give rise to appropriate
how claims of
10 4
legal action.
More than two decades ago, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in
DeSantis,0 5 defined Title VII's "because of sex" provision narrowly to
"refer[ ] to an person's gender and not to sexual practices.' 1 6 Under
DeSantis, an employer would not be liable for discriminating against a
person on the basis of sexual orientation.' 0 7 Positive attitudes toward
homosexuals since DeSantis may have influenced how courts today
view same-sex sexual harassment. 0 8 However, the Ninth Circuit Court
in Rene stated that DeSantis is still "good law" and noted that other
circuits have followed it. 109 However, a few months later another panel
of Ninth Circuit judges "abrogated DeSantis" with its holding that
harassment of male employees by other males qualified as "because of
B.

1
sex." 10

Presently, nine federal courts of appeals and the United States
Supreme Court have addressed the applicability of Title VII's "because
of sex" language in same-sex sexual harassment cases."' The courts
102. See Mogilefsky, 20 Cal. App. 4th at 1416.

103. DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
104. Compare Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enter., Inc. 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001) with
Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 243 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 305 F.3d 1061
(2002) (en banc).

105. DeSantis, 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
106. See id. at 332 (internal quotations omitted).
107. Seeid

108. See Rene, 243 F.3d at 1209 (noting how positive attitudes toward homosexuality
have changed resulting in DeSantis being questioned). See also Lambda Legal Defense and
Education Fund, Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Employment: A Guide to Remedies
(1998), available at http://www.lamdalegal.org (discussing Kilbom, Gay Rights Groups
Take Aim at Restaurant Chain That's Hot on Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, April 9, 1992, at

A12, col. 1. In 1991, the Cracker Barrel restaurant chain had a policy of refusing to hire
people "whose sexual preferences fail to demonstrate normal heterosexual values which

have been the foundation of families in our society."

Subsequent to making national

headlines, Cracker Barrel recanted and disregarded its own policy statement and practices
because of negative public opinion and pressure.).
109. See Rene, 243 F.3d at 1209.
110. See Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enter., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001).

111. The following federal circuit court cases address same-sex sexual harassment under
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have articulated some evidentiary standards to determine how sex
classification can be triggered under Title VIIC"2 Most of these
standards have proved unavailing because they have their genesis in
traditional sexual harassment claims, and therefore, are inadequate
analogues to same-sex sexual harassment disputes." 3
1. Arguments Opposing Recognition of Same-Sex Sexual
Harassment Under Title VII
In traditional sexual harassment between man and woman, courts
have had little trouble concluding that harassment is based on sex if a
heterosexual male implicitly or explicitly makes sexual advances or
gestures toward a female." 4 In same-sex cases, some courts refuse to
even characterize male-on-male physical behavior as sexual
harassment, because acting aggressive is "horseplay," inherent in the
rough ways that males interact with one another.1 5 The use of the term
Title VII: Garcia v. ELF Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994); Drinkwater v.
Union Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853 (3d Cir. 1990); Morgan v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 901 F.2d
186 (1st Cir. 1990); Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996); Doe v. City of
Belleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997); Fredette v. BVP Mgmt. Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503
(11 th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1003 (1998); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co.,
77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 927 (1996); Dillon v. Frank, 1992 WL
5436 (6th Cir.); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enter., Inc., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001); Rene v.
MGM Hotel, Inc., 243 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2001), rev d, 305 F.3d 1061 (2002) (en banc).
Due to space limited, only a selected number of same-sex sexual harassment federal circuit
cases alleging Title VII violations will be evaluated and discussed in this comment. A
comprehensive study is beyond the scope of this comment, but a blueprint for how same-sex
sexual harassment can be deconstructed and examined as an outgrowth of "because of sex."
112. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Svcs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78-79 (1998).
113. Traditional sexual harassment cases that involve sexual desire or attraction for the
victim infrequently come into play in same-sex sexual harassment disputes. Thus far, only
one recent federal case involves a male harasser propositioning a male victim. See Moto v.
Univ. of Tex. Houston Health Sci. Ctr., 261 F.3d 512 (5th Cir. 2001) ("because of sex"
requirement easily satisfied due to aggressive sexual advances made by the department head
toward the visiting professor). Additionally, Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson is frequently cited
in opposite-sex sexual harassment cases where sexual desire or animus gives rise to a hostile
work environment claim. See 477 U.S. 57 (1986). See also Delpo, supra note 21, at 5.
Sexual desire presupposes the reason a woman suffers harassment is because the male
harasser is sexually attracted to the victim. Within this purview, the defining characteristic
of sexual desire paradigm ignores the power dynamic inherent in the harasser's and the
victim's respective positions in the work force and in society as whole. See infra Part IV.
114. See Bibby v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 262 (3d Cir.
2001) ("It is easy to conclude or infer that the [male-to-female] behavior is motivated by her
sex."). However, it is far from easy or simple to presume male-on-male same-sex sexual
harassment is "because of sex." Theoretically, courts would also have no problem
concluding that harassment against a man by a woman is sex-based sexual harassment.
Modem media culture also gives rise to affirmation of opposite-sex sexual harassment
consciousness. See generally MICHAEL CRICHTON, DISCLOSURE (1994) (male employee as
the victim of female harassing superior).
115. See, e.g., Garcia v. ELF Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994).
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horseplay in a same-sex sexual harassment allegation was seen in
Garcia v. ELF Atochem of North America,"16 where plaintiff's
heterosexual supervisor approached him from behind and grabbed his
crotch, moving it in a sexually suggestive manner.17
In Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp.,1 8 the court also equated
sex with gender rather than sexual orientation. 1 9 Realizing that a
power imbalance exists between men and women, the court viewed
male-on-male sexual harassment claims as inappropriate, because
unlike women, there is no abuse of power against men by other men, as
men are viewed as each other's equals. 120 In contrast, women's
sexuality "defines women as women in this society, so violations of
[women's sexuality] are abuses of women as women," because they
insinuate that women are the weaker sex.121
2.

The Sexual Desire Test

Clear evidence that a harasser is provoked by a victim's sexual
orientation precludes the likelihood of meeting the statutory
requirement of "because of sex" under Title VII.122 In Bibby v.
Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 23 a reinstated plaintiff was
taunted with homophobic slurs: "Everybody knows you're [as] gay as a
three dollar bill .... Everybody knows you're a faggot ....,,124

He

was also called a "sissy.' 25 Short of such a clear case of homophobia,
"the question of how to prove that'' 26same-sex sexual harassment is
because of sex is not easy to answer."

116. See id
117. See id at 448. Courts in the past have been reluctant to categorize male-on-male
sexual attacks and verbal taunts as sexual harassment because of the notion that boys engage

in rough-play, often called "horseplay." Even if the harassment has sexual overtones, it is
not a per se violation of Title VII. See id. at 451-52 (quoting Giddens v. Shell Oil Co., 67
Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 576 (5th Cir. 1993)) ("Harassment by a male supervisor
against a male subordinate does not state a claim under Title VII even though the
harassment has sexual overtones.").

118. Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853, 853 (3d Cir. 1990).
119. See id "Sex... logically refer[s] to membership in a class delineated by gender."
Id.
at 860.
120. See id.
121. See id
122. See Rene v. MGM Hotel, Inc., 243 F.3d 1206, 1206 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 305 F.3d
1061 (2002) (en banc); see also supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
123. Bibby v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2001).
124. Id.at 259-60.

125. Id.at 260.
126. See id.at 262.
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3. The Hostility Toward Opposite Sex Test (Anti-Male/AntiFemale)
Under the third traditional analysis of workplace sexual
harassment, the harassing conduct may be properly classified as
"because of sex" when the harasser demonstrates hostility toward the
victim's sex. 17 Behaviors fall under this standard if, for example, "a
woman chief executive officer of an airline believes that women should
not be pilots and treats women pilots with hostility amounting to
harassment."' 2 8 The same would hold true if, for instance, a male
doctor takes adverse employment action against a male nurse premised
on the notion that being a man means preclusion from serving the
duties of a nurse, a traditionally-held female position. 2 9 Regardless of
the various scenarios, this "hostility" paradigm essentially examines
"whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or
conditions of employment which members of the other sex are not.' 30

In Quick v. Donaldson Co., 13 1 a male heterosexual worked in an
environment where other male employees frequently engaged in
"bagging," a practice in which men attempt to grab and squeeze one
another's testicles. 132 For over two years, plaintiff was subjected to this
unwanted behavior from his male coworkers. 3 3 When reviewing the
district court's opinion, the Eighth Circuit noted that the lower court's
tone was dismissive and reflected the view that "boys were acting like
34
boys," instead of recognizing same-sex sexual harassment.

4.

The Sex Stereotype Test
Employment decisions based on a person's gender stereotypes
may also violate Title VII. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 35 an
127. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Svcs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
128. See Bibby, 260 F.3d at 262.
129. See id.
130. See Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996). See also Kopp v.
Samaritan Health Sys., Inc., 13 F.3d 264, 269-70 (8th Cir. 1993). The hostility toward one
sex model explicitly entails consideration of male and female gender.
131. See Quick, 90 F.3d at 1372.
132. See id.
133. See id at 1374.
134. See id. at 1296. The district court categorized the practice of "bagging" as
"unnecessary juvenile behavior." Id.
135. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).

SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT

2002]

accounting firm was precluded from denying a female associate
partnership on account of her failure to conform to the firm's
expectation that female senior managers should dress and appear
feminine. 136 The stereotypical view of the female professional is that
she should not exhibit "male traits" by demonstrating overbearing,
dominant, or aggressive behavior. 137 By reserving these traits for men,
employers in the competitive fields of business or law are essentially
ensuring professional success and accolades to males, whose
aggressiveness is expected in securing multi-million dollar accounts,
38
similar to the one secured by Ann Hopkins in Price Waterhouse.'
Employing sex stereotypes about a person, as to his or her status as a
male or female, invariably concerns sex discrimination with overt acts
or by reason of sex stereotyping in violation of Title VII. This situation
scenarios that mirror
may arise in several same-sex sexual harassment
39
Waterhouse.1
Price
in
Hopkins
of
the plight
The Effeminate Man

a.

An effeminate man may also state a same-sex sexual harassment
claim against fellow male employees or supervisors in circumstances
where he is harassed because of preconceived notions of masculinity
41
and maleness. 140 In Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc.,1
Antonio Sanchez hosted and waited tables for approximately four

136. See id. One of the male partners described Hopkins' personality as being "too
macho," and that she needs to learn to "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress
Other negative evaluations of Hopkins included
more femininely, wear make-up."
comments that she needed "a course at charm school" and that her aggressiveness indicated
that she "overcompensated for being a woman." Id. at 235.

137. See id. at 257-58. Some partners objected to Hopkins' use of profanity "because
it's a lady using foul language." See also James 0. Castagnera, Sex Discrimination Based
Upon Sexual Stereotyping, 53 AM. JUR. TRIALS 299 (1995 & 2001 Supp.). Another

stereotype used to keep women in their place and out of the work force is that women are
emotional, irrational, or hysterical. The word "hysterical" dates back to Western civilization
when Hippocrates, the "Father of Modem Medicine" theorized women's emotions were

caused by their wombs influencing their body and mind, being cured only by marriage. Id.
(quoting ROBERT C. CARSON &

JAMES NEAL BUTCHER, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY IN

MODERN LIFE 201 (Harper Collins, 9th ed. 1992)).

138. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235.
139. See id at 236.
140. See Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enter., Inc. 256 F.3d 864, 873 (9th Cir. 2001).

Affording protection for effeminate males which do not conform with societal preconceived
notions of masculinity and maleness invariably would exclude protection for males who do
fit into masculine stereotypes but nonetheless suffer invidious discrimination and
harassment.

See also Bianchi v. City of Philadelphia, 767 A.2d 31 (3d Cir. 2001)

(unpublished) (no sex stereotype argument that masculine firefighter did not conform to
stereotypes of masculinity and maleness).

141. See id.
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years, during which time his supervisor and coworkers harassed him,
calling him a "faggot" and "a fucking female whore."' 142 They also
' ' 43
repeatedly referred to him using female pronouns "she" and "her,
and ridiculed him for carrying his waiter's tray "like a woman.' 44 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that this series of harassing
interchanges was "closely related to gender" in violation of Title VII.145
In contrast, in Dillon v. Frank,46 a postal employee on several
occasions was called a "fag," and had his name written in graffiti on
the walls of the restroom stating that Dillon performs oral sex on
men. 147 Arguing sex stereotyping, Dillon alleged "he was not deemed
'macho' enough by his coworkers," and the "abuse relating to [his
perceived] homosexuality [was visited upon him] solely because he
was [an inferior] man."' 148 Similar to Price Waterhouse, Dillon's claim
also bears closely to his gender. However, the court disregarded his
sex stereotyping claim on the ground that "Dillon's co-workers
deprived him of a proper work environment because they believed [he
was a] homosexual," as opposed to harassing him because of his
49
gender. 1
b. The Single, Celibate Guy
In addition to those who are too effeminate, men who choose to
remain bachelors and not date or have intercourse with women are
ridiculed by coworkers on the basis of gender stereotyping. 150 Since
male virility is frequently equated with masculinity, the failure of a
man to engage romantically with women may signal to coworkers that
the celibate man is not "man enough" and/or is homosexual. 151
Because same-sex sexual harassment could be provoked by either of
these inferences, the interconnectedness of sex and sexual orientation is
implicated as a result of society's perception of an inadequate man.152
142. See Scott Sunde, Ex-Azteca Worker Wins Suit: Co-Workers' Taunts Over Gender
ConstituteHarassment, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 17, 2001, at B2.

143. See id
144. See id.
145. See Nichols, 256 F.3d at 869.
146. Dillon v. Frank, 1192 WL 5436 (6th Cir.) (unpublished).

147. See id. The graffiti on the wall stated that "Dillon sucks dicks." See id.
148. See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683
(1998). See Dillon, 1992 WL 5436 at *5.
149. See id.
150. See Schultz, supra note 148, at 1778.
151. See id. In mixed motive cases, the harasser's state of mind may include both
legitimate and illegitimate factors.
152. See discussion infra Part IV.
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Depending on the chosen profession or career, gender stereotypes
may have a far more serious and adverse effect on the Title VII
harassed victim. 153 For example, the male mechanic who is unmarried
and asexual may experience harassing aggressive behavior by those
who are threatened by his chosen lifestyle or bachelor status. 154 In
Goluszek v. Smith, 1 55 an electronic repair mechanic who worked in an
all-male environment was chastised by male coworkers for lacking the
' ' 56
necessary sexual prowess and experience dating women to "fit in. "
Because Goluszek was unmarried and blushed easily at references to
57
sexual topics, he was an easy target for harassment based on his sex.'
Unable to compartmentalize the harassment as either the off-spring of
sexual lust for the victim or a general hostility toward other male
coworkers, the court had difficulty158determining that the harassment in
this instance was based on gender.

c.

The Earring Wearing Teenager

Males on the brink of puberty often appear boyish and, to an
extent, feminine or not quite as masculine as fully-grown men, may
also be sexually harassed because of sex in the same way as the
effeminate man or single/celibate guy-under a theory of sexual
59
streotyping. Take, for example, the case of Doe v. City of Belleville,1
wherein two heterosexual teenage twin brothers worked in an all-male
environment during the summer.' 60 They endured a barrage of verbal
and physical abuse about their respective sexual orientations and

153. See Schultz, supra note 148 (citing JENNIFER L. PIERCE, GENDER TRIALS:
EMOTIONAL LIVES IN CONTEMPORARY LAW FIRMS 50-82 (1995) (male trial lawyers

characterizing themselves as "Rambo Litigators" which connotes a certain hyperaggressiveness). See also CYNTHIA COCKBURN, MACHINERY OF DOMINANCE: WOMEN,
MEN, AND THE TECHNICAL KNOW HOW 171-76 (Northwestern University Press 1988) (the

same gender-based stereotypes for the engineering and technical industry).

See also

ROBERT CONNELL, GENDER AND POWER: SOCIETY, THE PERSON AND SEXUAL POLITICS

180 (1987) (blue-collar men who regard their work in terms of physical prowess).
154. See Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
155. See id.
156. See id. at 1453.
He was taunted for not having a girlfriend, for living with his mother, and
157. See id.
for being sexually inexperienced. Coworkers recommended he date another female
coworker to "get laid." Id.
158. See id at 1456.
159. Doe v. City ofBelleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997).
160. See id.However, the use of Doe is merely for illustrative purposes to highlight
another gender-based stereotype of masculinity in light of the Price Waterhouse case.
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physical appearances. 161 One teen was called "fat boy," while the other
was labeled a "fag" and "queer" because he wore an earring.' 62 One
coworker, a "hulking former marine," told the brother with the earring
to return to San Francisco with all the other "queers," and repeatedly
questioned his gender.' 63 This same aggressor also threatened to
perform various unwanted sexual acts upon the plaintiff. 64 Not only
were the coworkers abusive, but the head supervisor also participated
165
in the verbal taunting of the two teens.
Although most of the Doe opinion is no longer good law, its
discussion relating to Price Waterhouse remains viable.' 6 6 Thus,
harassment predicated on a perception that a man has certain
stereotypically feminine characteristics, such as a soft voice, slight
physique, or long hair, may violate Title VII, because these remarks
67
may relate to stereotypes about his gender. 1

C.

EmpiricalStudies on Sexual Orientation
In constitutional jurisprudence, courts that sometimes afford
greater protection to homosexuals discriminated against because of
sexual orientation do so because they believe sexual orientation is an
immutable characteristic. 68 Immutability is defined as "the condition
of a characteristic or trait" that is "(1) either unalterable by a voluntary
act of will by the individual or alterable only with substantial cost or
difficulty to the individual; and (2) not having been acquired through
169
the voluntary choice of the individual."'
161. See id.
162. See id at 567.

163. See id. Plaintiffs harasser asked him, "are you a boy or a girl?" Id. See also
WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1584 (7th ed. 1996). In the fifth

and eleventh definitions: "Queer" is defined as a disparaging and offensive slang remark
that someone is a "homosexual" or "effeminate; unmanly," and specifically referring to a
"male homosexual." Id.

164. See Doe, 119 F.3d at 567.
165. See id
166. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
167. See id. at 581. The Court's interpretation that sexual harassment violates Title VII
merely because of the nature of the content of the harassment has been expressly abrogated

by the Supreme Court in the Oncale decision.
168. See Edward Stein, Evaluating The Sex DiscriminationArgument For Lesbian And
Gay Rights, 49 UCLA L. REV. 471 (2001).

See also Woodard v. Gallagher, 1992 WL

252279 at *3 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1992) ("[T]he only reason they have not been granted heightened
equal protection rights is because the difference in them touches people's deeply ingrained
heterosexual orientation both personally and culturally. The heterosexual orientation is

biologically, psychologically, and morally ingrained in our culture ... ").
169. See Samuel A. Marcosson, Constructive Immutability, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 646
(2001). "Few people would dispute that a characteristic may be regarded as immutable even
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The rationale behind stronger protection against discrimination
based on immutability is that it would be unfair to permit
discrimination on the basis of a characteristic that is impossible or
difficult to change.' 70 Proponents who argue a biologically-based
theory-that sexual identity is innate or biologically determined-often
cite ground-breaking scientific research suggesting that humans are a
product of our biology. 171 Whether homosexuality is caused by "nature
or nurture," that is, a product of our biology or our environment,
or a
72
combination thereof remains unanswered and controversial. 1
Consider the particulars of a grooming discrimination case' 73 that
addresses the special challenges of people afflicted with
pseudofolliculitis barbae (PFB), a rare skin disease.' 74 Here, growing a
beard to help cover the skin disorder was seen as an immutable trait
even though those affected by the employer's grooming policy could
(theoretically) shave their facial hair. 75 Interestingly, race has not been
universally considered immutable.' 76
Historically, whether an
individual's race was considered immutable depended on the region of
the country wherein he resided, and the socio-political environment of
the time. 177 However, proponents of biologically-based theory are not
if it can change via a natural progression like growing up [i.e. height]." Id.
170. See Stein, supra note 168, at 478.
171. See discussion infra Part II.C.
172. The following are the most widely cited scientific studies on the origins of sexual
orientation: J. Michael Bailey & Richard Pillard, A Genetic Study of Male Sexual
Orientation, 48 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY (1991), Dean H. Hamer et al., A Linkage
Between DNA Markers on the X Chromosome and Male Sexual Orientation, 261 SCIENCE
321 (1993), and Simon LeVay, A Difference in Hypothalamic Structure Between
Heterosexual and Homosexual Men, 253 SCIENCE 1034 (1991). See also DEAN H. HAMER
& PETER COPELAND, THE SCIENCE OF DESIRE: THE SEARCH FOR THE GAY GENE AND THE
BIOLOGY OF BEHAVIOR (1994).
173. See Bradley v. Pizzaco, 7 F.3d 795 (8th Cir. 1993). Plaintiff suffered from a rare
skin condition affecting approximately fifty percent of the African American population.
Only twenty-five percent of the African Americans inflicted with this disease could shave
their facial hair without too much pain. Title VII's prohibition against discrimination on the
basis of "religion" includes "all aspects of religious observance and practice," which
includes grooming or business attire standards imposed by an employer. Id.
174. Seeid
175. See id at 612 ("The record shows PFB almost exclusively affects black males and
white males rarely suffer from PFB [skin condition] ....).
176. See MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED
STATES FROM THE 1960s to 1980s, 58-59 (1986) (highly regarded groundbreaking work that
explores the theory that race is a social construct and not a fixed state of permanence.).
177. See id In the landmark case Plessy v. Ferguson, Homer Plessy had "seven-eighth
Caucasian and one-eighth African blood" and was extremely fair skinned; nevertheless his
presence in the "whites only" section of the train violated the 1890 Louisiana segregation
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78
without their critics. 1

1. The Hypothalamic Difference
Simon LeVay, 179 a neuro-biologist, studied the hypothalamus of
human beings to determine the sexual differences between homosexual
and heterosexual men. 180 In the scientific community, it is universally
accepted that the anterior hypothalamus regulates the sexual behavior
of human beings.'18 LeVay measured the interstitial nuclei of the
anterior hypothalamus (INAH) 1, 2, 3, and 4 from postmortem tissues
of "women, men who were presumed to be heterosexual, and
homosexual men."'' 82 In the first, second, and fourth INAH, no
differences were found among the groups. 183 Only in INAH-3 was the
difference significant: INAH-3 was twice as large in heterosexual men
than in homosexual men.' 84 Based on these results, LeVay concluded
that this difference "indicates that [the] INAH is dimorphic with sexual
orientation, at least in
men, and suggests that sexual orientation has a
'' 85
substrate."
biological
statute, known as a "Jim Crow" law. Race in this regard is more geographically connected
or socially accepted rather than strictly biologically rooted. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163

U.S. 537 (1896).
178. See, e.g., Douglas C. Haldeman, The Practice and Ethics of Sexual Orientation
Conversion Therapy, 62 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 221 (1994); Douglas C.

Haldeman, Sexual OrientationConversion Therapyfor Gay Men and Lesbians: A Scientific
Examination, in HOMOSEXUALITY: RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 139
(John C. Gonsiorek & James D. Weinrich eds., 1991) (proposing the notion that gays and
lesbians could be "straightened out" and returned to hererosexual normalcy).
179. Simon LeVay holds a doctorate in Neuroanatomy from the University of Gottingen,
Germany in 1970, and a bachelor's degree in Natural Science from Cambridge University
(Dulwich College) in 1966. After his relocation to the United States, he was a Postdoctoral
Research Fellow at Harvard Medical School from 1971-1974. Subsequently from 1974
until 1984, Harvard Medical School extended him the position of instructor, assistant, and
then associate professor in the Department of Neurobiology, where his studies and teaching
centered on the human brain's development, structure, and function, namely in the area of
the visual system. From 1984-1992, he served as an associate professor at the Salk Institute
for
Biological
Studies
in
La
Jolla,
California,
available
at
http://hometown.aol.com/slevay/page3.html, (last visited November 16, 2002).
180. See LeVay, A Difference in Hypothalamic Structure Between Heterosexual and
Homosexual Men, 253 SCIENCE 1034 (1991).
181.

See id.

182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. See LeVay, A Difference in Hypothalamic Structure Between Heterosexual and
Homosexual Men, 253 SCI. 1034 (1991). Sexual orientation as defined by LeVay is "the
direction of sexual feelings or behavior towards members of one's own or the opposite sex."
Id. LeVay noticed that both heterosexual men and homosexual women who are attracted to
the female gender possess larger INAH 2 and 3, while homosexual men and heterosexual
women, attracted to the male gender, have a smaller INAH. The differences between
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2. The Gay Gene
Dean Hamer, 186 a molecular biologist at the National Institutes of
Health, was an early pioneer in conducting research linking sexual
orientation to genetic makeup. 187 Hamer investigated genetics in male
sexual orientation by "pedigree and linkage analyses on 114 families of
homosexual men" in order to determine if the gay gene is derived from
familial lineage. 188 To conduct this research, Hamer interviewed more
than 1,000 gay men and their families to determine whether other
family members were attracted romantically, whether in fantasy or in
189
actuality, to members of the same sex.

Hamer found that an "increased rate of same-sex orientation in the
maternal uncles and male cousins.., but not in their fathers or paternal
relatives" suggests "the possibility of sex-linked transmission in a
portion of the population."' 90 In a group of forty families in which
there were twin gay brothers and "no indication of nonmaternal
transmission," there was a "correlation between homosexual
orientation and the inheritance of polymorphic markers on the X

homosexual and heterosexual men are allegedly caused by changes that take place during
prenatal stages of childbirth. See id. For a definition of sexual dimorphism, see WEBSTER'S
NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY at 1755 (Random House Publishing, Inc.
1996) Sexual dimorphism is defined as the "condition in which the males and females in a
species are morphologically different .... " For a legal discussion assessing various
scientific arguments for immutability of sexual orientation, see E. Gary Spitko, A Biologic
Argument For Gay Essentialism-Determinism: Implications For Equal Protection and
Substantive Due Process, 18 U. HAW. L. REv. 571, 578 (1996).
186. Dean Hamer received his doctorate from Harvard Medical School and his
bachelor's degree from Trinity College in Connecticut. For twenty-four years, he worked at
the National Institutes of Health, where he served as the Chief of the Section on Gene
Structure and Regulation in the Laboratory of Biochemistry of the National Cancer Institute.
He has published over 100 scientific papers in the area of recombinant DNA, drug and
vaccine production, and gene regulation. See Dr. Dean Hamer's Webpage, available at
http://rex.nci.nih.gov/RESEARCH/basic/biochem/hamer.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2002).
187. See id. Hamer's work linking genetics to sexual orientation have "changed the way
we think about human behavior and raise a host of important scientific, social and ethical
issues." Id. See also Dean H. Hamer et al., A Linkage Between DNA Markers on the X
Chromosome and Male Sexual Orientation, SCIENCE 261:320-326 (1993) [hereinafter
Hamer, Linkage]; DEAN H. HAMER & PETER COPELAND, THE SCIENCE OF DESIRE (Simon
& Schuster, New York, 1994); Simon LeVay & Hamer DH, Evidence for a Biological
Influence in Male Homosexuality, in SCI. AM. 270:20-25 (1994).
188. See Hamer et al., Linkage, supra note 187, at 321-27.
189. See HAMER & COPELAND, supra note 187, at 54-55 (1994). Those interviewed
stated that they had always known of their sexual orientation, evident before puberty and
expected it would never change. See id.at 65-73.
190. See Hamer et al., Linkage, supra note 187.
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" '
chromosome in approximately 64%" of the sibling twins tested.19
Additionally, the "subtelomeric region," abbreviated as Xq28 and
located on the long arm of the sex chromosome had a "multipoint lod
score of 4.0 (P=10(-5))."' 92 This score means that there is "a statistical
one subtype of male
confidence level of more than 99% that at ' least
93
sexual orientation is genetically influenced."'

In 1999, Hamer's findings were re-tested by other scientists, who
confirmed that homosexuality is both familial and an inherited trait,
carried on the X chromosome. 194 Critics of the so-called "gay genes"
argue that the influence of genes on sexual orientation is not
conclusive.195 Other scientists have provided estimates that genetic
contributions influence sexual orientation at a rate as high as 70%.196
The remaining influences are caused by a "complex mixture of
stimuli. But how much
biological developments and environmental
97
power each wields is as yet unknown."'

III.

IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM

Men are increasingly bringing sexual harassment claims under
Title VII against male coworkers and supervisors, believing that they
191. See id An abstract of Hamer's findings is available on PubMed, the public medical
library and services, which collects scientific works from the National Library of Medicine.
See Dean Hamer, Rethinking Behavior Genetics, available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
(PMID 12364769) (last visited Jan. 7, 2002).

192. Id.
193. See Hamer et al., Linkage, supra note 187.
194. See Bailey, J. et al., A Family History Study of Male Sexual Orientation Using
Three Independent Samples, BEHAV. GENETICS 29:79-86 (1999). Criticizing population
samples gathered by prior studies due to self-selection methodology, Professor Bailey of
Northwestern University, Department of Psychology, carefully gathered three independent
samples to replicate findings consistent with the X-linkage. Bailey found that there is a high
degree of certainty that the percentage of siblings rated as homosexual or bisexual ranged
from 7%-10% for brothers and 3%-4% for sisters. See also Mubarak Dahir, Why Are We
Gay?, THE ADVOCATE, July 17, 2001, at 30, 35. Of the fifty-six gay men with identical
twin brothers, 52% of them also had a gay twin. Among the fifty-four fraternal twins, it was
the case that 22% were gay. Lastly, in the adoption control group, only 11% of the fiftyseven men had gay brothers. See id.
195. Robert Pitzer, a psychiatrist at Columbia University, believed that 66% of male
homosexuals and 44% of lesbians could convert to heterosexuality if they are "highly
motivated." See Dahir, supra note 194, at 38. Critics of Pitzer cite to his over-reliance on
See id.
test subjects who were affiliated with religious right-wing organizations.
Additionally, his methodology included interviewing 200 "ex-gays." Id.
196. Seeid. at35.
197. See id at 35-37. Pillard, a psychiatrist at Boston University School of Medicine,
who also participated in the Bailey studies commented that "[all] this [research] shows that
sexual orientation is largely genetics." Id.
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should be as equally protected by the law as their female
counterparts. 98 The issues arising under Title VII's "because of sex"
provision, however, have long been challenged through the courts.' 99
The foundation upon which "because of sex" stands can be
characterized as unstable at best, and makes for fertile and interesting
discussion of the conflicting decisions in the federal courts, particularly
in the Ninth Circuit. 200 With the large body of case law unclear on the
issues addressed in this comment, more attempts to draw the line of
demarcation between sex and sexual orientation are expected in the
federal courts in the upcoming years.
The interplay between gender and sexual orientation as indicated
by comments such as "fucking female whore" and "faggot" makes it
difficult to determine when the harassment amounts to gender
discrimination, sexual orientation discrimination, or a mixture of both
forms of discrimination. 20 ' A court seeking to conclude that such
ambiguous harassment is the product of gender discrimination need not
look further than Nichols to find a holding that the behavior is "closely
related to gender., 20 2 However, a conclusion could also be drawn just
as easily, that calling someone a "faggot" demonstrates the harasser's
state of mind, based on sexual orientation discrimination.

As an additional challenge, homophobic slurs may play off gender
remarks in certain circumstances, as evidenced when terms such as
"sissy" or "faggot" are used to insult and degrade a male. 0 3 Without
clear standards applied to when the "sex" factor is triggered in samesex sexual harassment claims under Title VII, the confluence of stateof-mind and gender-based comments further confounds an already
confusing area of law, making
it difficult to discern when the
20 4
harassment is "because of sex.,

198. See EEOC Statistics, supra note 35. The very idea that men suffer sexual
harassment is seen, all too frequently, as some sort of joke. With the large and increasing
number of males being harassed by other males and females, no longer is same-sex sexual
harassment seen as a meritless or absurd claim.

199. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Svcs., 523 U.S. 75, 78-79 (1998).
200. For a list of federal circuit cases discussing same-sex sexual harassment cases
under Title VII, see supra note 111.
201. See, e.g., Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enter., Inc., 256 F.3d 864 (3d Cir. 2001).

202. See id at 869.
203. See Bibby v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 260 (3d Cir.
2001).
204. See discussion infra Part IV.
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Statutory interpretation confined to words such as "because of
sex," without a clear definition and understanding from Congress adds
additional complexity in analyzing "sex" in same-sex sexual
harassment cases. As evidenced by the rising number of same-sex
sexual harassment claims in the workplace, ambiguous statutory
language only fuels further confusion, often leading to untenable
results, which will continue to befuddle the courts. As a matter of
public concern and policy, this confusion must be corrected and
remedied.
IV. ANALYSIS

A.

Reasons for the Courts' Confusion

While this comment opens with the prophetic words penned by
former President Wilson in 1885, its message underscores the current
confusion over statutory interpretation of Title VII. 20 5 The process of
legislation continuously requires revisions and modifications until a
statute's gaps are narrowed and its shortcomings eliminated. °6 For
example, during a time when pregnancy and childbirth were seen as
hindering a woman's equal access to the fair employment that men
have long enjoyed, the need and push for legislative change resulted in
Congress passing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.20 7 Through that
Act, Congress infused new meanings into the original nondescript
phrase, "because of sex" and gave "sex" as a protected class new
meaning, through its close nexus to childbirth and pregnancy. 208

While Title VII's birth into American society may have heralded
principles of racial equality and justice unheard of in prior times, its
beginning also engendered much confusion over basic statutory
terms. 20 9 The current confusion unfolding in the courts over classifying
harassing conduct in sex discrimination is indicative of the courts'
struggle to define Title VII's protected classes. 210 However, "because

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

See
See
See
See
See

Kernochan, supra note 1.
id.
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 92 STAT. 2076.
United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 821, 821 (1983), rev d, 742 F.2d 1081,

1081 (7th Cir. 1984).
210. See Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y, 791 F.2d 888, 891 (11th Cir.
1986).
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of sex" was not the first time the judicial system grappled with one of
Title VII's "because of' classifications. Equally bewildering to the
courts in the past has been the phrase, "because of race," as aptly noted
in the Parrcase. 211
Protection against "sex" discrimination was not one of the initial
concerns of the drafters of Title VII, until an opposing politician threw
"sex" into the mix of Title VII in order to discourage passage of the
entire Civil Rights Act of 1964.212
Within this context, it is
understandable that confusion remains at a peak in the courts even
today. Civil code countries 213 historically have criticized the U.S.
legislative process as unintelligible and overly
complicated, resulting in
214
confusing and inconsistent court decisions.
A literalist or textualist interpretation that merely examines the
four-corners of the statute ignores the apparent interconnectivity
between a woman's gender, pregnancy, and childbirth. This method of
analysis may not be the sufficient to clear the confusion in same-sex
sexual harassment. As an indication, other states have modified their
215
anti-discrimination statutes to avoid Title VII's glaring problems.
These problems should prompt Congress to revise Title VII again.

B.

TraditionalRationale Against Same-Sex Sexual Harassment
Claims Is Gender Discrimination

A traditional analysis of power imbalance, as seen in Drinkwater,
reinforces stereotypes about the sexes. 16 In particular, the message
conveyed is that women are less powerful and need protection, while
the same need does not exist for men. Power imbalance analysis, in
211. Seeid.
212. See 110 CONG. REC. 2577-84 (1964).
213. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 176 (6th ed. 1991). Civil code is derived from the

French Napoleonic code in 1804. When Napoleon became emperor, the name was changed
to "Code Napoleon," by which it is not officially styled by its original name of "Code
Civil." Louisiana's legal system is modeled after the "Code Civil." Id.
214. A civilian legal system differs from a common law system much as rationalism
differs from empiricism, or deduction from induction. The civilian naturally reasons from
principles to inference, the common law lawyer from inferences to principles. But the
predominance of the statutes on the continental is not so strong anymore. The law is
increasingly developed by judges, giving more room to inductive methods. See KONRAD
ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 271 (3d ed. 1998, trans.

Tony Weir).
215. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
216. See Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853, 863 (3d Cir. 1990).
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essence, reifies and strengthens patriarchy and paternalism within our
society, both of which, like racial discrimination, were socially
acceptable for all of the nineteenth and most of the twentieth centuries.
Furthermore, there are several problems left unresolved after
Drinkwater.2 17 First, the asymmetrical power imbalance between the
sexes may vary, depending on the employment relationship and the
relative positions of power and physical strength of the harasser and the
victim. 218 Further, the power imbalance analysis does not take into
account specific circumstances where men in positions of power, or
men who are physically more domineering, can subjugate and/or
subject other men to the type of harassment women in inferior
employment positions have long endured. 2 19 To hold the position that
males are always wielding power and are dominant brands them
unfairly and stereotypically as perpetual harassers. Unfortunately, this
stance also makes a male's status as a harassed victim invisible in
same-sex sexual harassment cases. 220 This contradicts the goals of
Title VII, which were to remove "artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary
barriers ' '221 against an individual based on stereotypical notions of
class. This meant that "even a true generalization about the class is an
insufficient reason for disqualifying [or terminating] an individual. 222
Another rationale relied upon by the courts for excluding samesex sexual harassment claims is the notion that men are just behaving
217. See id.
218. See id. The Court's analysis in Drinkwater fails to account for situations where
women hold the high-powered supervisorial authority over men, or that neither sex
dominates one another. Id.
219. For an example of male subjugation and inferiority, where two teenagers are
sexually and physically victimized by several men, including a muscular and "hulking
former marine." See Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 567 (7th Cir. 1997).
220. See HADLEY & CHAZI, supra note 7, at Chap. 3, §10. For same-sex sexual
harassment cases, most sexual harassment complaints are by men bringing actions against
other men. Id. As for opposite-sex harassment against men, one need not look further than
popular fiction to find that men have also been subjected to sexual harassment by women.
See CRICHTON, supra note 114. See also Weston v. County of Pennsylvania, 2001 WL
1491132 (E.D. Pa.) (female sexually harassing male coworker in an incarceration working
environment).
221. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971) (discussion of Title VI1's
purpose of preventing artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment).
222. See City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702
(1978). The basic principle of equal treatment dictates that minority, as well as majority, are
protected by Title VII, regardless of broad and over-generalized stereotypes. See also
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976). Section 703(a)(1) of Title
VII prohibits the discharge of "any individual" because of "such individual's race," whether
he or she belongs to the minority or majority. See also 110 CONG. REC. 2578 (1964). The
legislative history of Title Vt1 was intended to "cover white men and white women and all
Americans" (Statement by Representative Celler), and there is "an obligation not to
discriminate against whites." Id. (Memorandum of Senator Clark).
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223
like their natural selves, acting like boys or "horseplaying.
Although "horsing around" implies consent, consent is not a given. In
fact, a Title VII plaintiff does not agree to unwanted physical and
sexual violation of his person. The stereotypes that permeate the
horseplay and power imbalance rationales are nothing more than guises
for gender-based stereotypes, replete throughout analyses by the Quick
and Garcia courts. 2 24 Furthermore, a court engages in gender
discrimination every time it excuses harassing behavior merely because
the offender uttered crude verbal taunts to men rather than to women.
As stated in Quick, sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination,
particularly in same-sex scenarios, whenever "members of one sex are
exposed to
disadvantageous terms or conditions" not imposed on the
225
other sex.

C.

The Confusion Continues

The sexual desire analysis has also caused confusion for the
courts. The court in Goluszek struggled to achieve clarity by using
sexual desire in its analysis, which instead was the source of much of
its confusion.226 Since the harassment was neither an outgrowth of
sexual desire for the victim nor due to a general hostility against males,
the Goluszek court had difficulty understanding the gender connection
in same-sex sexual harassment.2 27 Searching for sexual desire in samesex sexual harassment cases is a problematic framework because the
theory was originally designed to analyze and resolve harassing malefemale interactions.228 Thus, this theory is difficult to apply in samesex harassment cases.229 Sexual desire will rarely produce the
necessary "sex" element in same-sex sexual harassment, unless the
harasser offers a confession that he targets the victim because of sex, or
that he is a closeted homosexual in search of male coworkers to
victimize. 230 Any sexual desire analysis is a myopic perspective, and
generally inapplicable in same-sex harassment disputes.
As an
instrument for inferring whether gender or sexual orientation plays any
role in the harassment, sexual desire will only continue to distract
223. See Axam, supra note 2.
224. See discussion supra Part II.

225. See Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1379 (8th Cir. 1996).
226. See Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1455-56 (N.D. Il1. 1988).

227. See id
228. See MeritorSav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 58.
229. See Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456. See also HADLEY & CHUZI, supra note 7
(discussing the Goluszek v. Smith case for recognizing the notion that Title VII was only

intended to protect female victims from sexual harassment in a male-dominated world).
230. See Moto v. Univ. of Texas Houston Health Sci. Ctr., 261 F.3d 512 (5th Cir. 2001).
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courts, as it did in Goluszek, from delineating sex and sexual
orientation discrimination.
Like racial identity, a person's sexual identity is one of the
components that make the person whole. It would be folly to permit
discrimination to persist on the basis of sexual orientation. Still, courts
continue to operate in a state of confusion, because they are attempting
to separate aspects of identity that are inseparable. 231 By doing so,
courts would be employing arbitrary conjectures, which would make it
impossible for them to distinguish correctly when harassing conduct
occurs because of sex or sexual orientation. Even if the victim believes
that the harassment springs from animus towards homosexuals, the
tormented victim may not be in the best position, psychologically, to
evaluate his predicament, or ascertain the harasser's motivations. 32
For this reason, it would be unwise for a court to use subjective
testimony from a traumatized victim to infer his harasser's state of
mind.
It may not always be clear that the harassment is predicated on
sexual orientation instead of gender, as in situations involving the meek
and effeminate male. In Rene, the court accepted plaintiffs subjective
belief that he was harassed for being a known homosexual, without
taking into account the underlying stress a harassed victim in plaintiffs
condition often endures.2 33 However, a plaintiffs belief should not
obviate the gender-specific themes motivating the harassment.
Specifically, being called a female doll in Spanish and being "touched
like a woman" tend to show that gender was the controlling force
behind the harassment. 4
In essence, the majority in Rene imposed on plaintiff an
unrealistic burden of proof that he should use his insight to read his
harassers' discriminatory intent. To conclude this way ignores the
victim's subjugation, belaboring under the constant harassment. This
requirement imposed by the courts is subjective and thus
insurmountable because an emotional victim cannot be certain why his
perpetrators targeted him. This subjectivity inherent in the majority's

231. See Schultz, supra note 148, at 1713.
232. It is questionable as to how Medina Rene's state of mind, after experiencing the
type of verbal, physical, and sexual abuses inflicted upon him, could correctly conclude that
the harassment took place because of his sexual orientation. See Rene v. MGM Grand
Hotel, Inc., 243 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 305 F.3d 1061 (2002) (en banc).
233. See id.
234. See id

2002]

SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT

opinion in Rene prompted appellate review to determine if Rene was
appropriately decided-the en banc court held it was not.235 It is clear
that evidence of being called a female doll suggests that the harassment
may be gender discrimination, even when homophobic tendency is
equally at work.
D.

The Line Between Sex and Sexual Orientation

The theory of sex stereotyping also shows the interconnectedness
of sex and sexual orientation. Homosexuality is seen as a type of
gender deviance, ripe for aggressive, dominant, heterosexual males to
ridicule and harass. Being asexual and celibate while working
alongside other masculine mechanics, Goluzsek was expected to have a
girlfriend or be married to a woman.2 36 The type of "rough" and hard
physical labor in which Goluzsek was employed further intensified the
need to conform to the male stereotype of sexual virility or suffer the
consequences.237 As a possible heterosexual standard, being unmarried
and living at home with his mother raised suspicions that he was either
both inadequate as a man or a homosexual, uninterested in women.238
Faced with these two possible explanations for why the harasser caused
the sexual harassment, it is unfeasible for a court to correctly choose
either motive. In fact, both motives are intertwined and may equally
influence a harasser's intent to mistreat Goluzsek.

To further complicate matters, another variation of gender
deviance involves the link between homosexuality and effeminacy for
a male or masculinity for a female. In Nichols, Sanchez was harassed
239
for carrying his tray "like a woman" and for acting like a "faggot.9
The court recognized that the harassing conduct involved both gender
240
and sexual orientation considerations, because of sex stereotyping.
The court however failed to explain that the use of gender is the
triggering mechanism for sexual orientation, because to the harasser,
235. See Rene, 243 F.3d at 1211. The plurality opinion of the en banc court, as penned
by Judge William Fletcher, held that "an employee's sexual orientation ... neither provides
nor precludes a cause of action for sexual harassment ...[t]hat the harasser is, or may be,
motivated by hostility based on sexual orientation is similarly irrelevant." Rene, 305 F.3d
1061, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
236. See generally Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
237. See id.
238. See id
239. See Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enter., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 870 (9th Cir. 2001).
240. See id

SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 43

homosexuality is nothing more than the failure of the victim to
conform to gender norms and act according to male social roles in the
presence of other males.
In contrast, the court in Dillon missed the close connection
between sex and sexual orientation.2 41 Dillon alleged that the
harassment was caused by his coworkers' perception of him as an
inferior man, not "macho" enough to work with them.242 Dillon's
coworkers denigrated his masculinity and questioned his manhood by
resorting to homophobic slurs and attacks.24 3 These facts demonstrate
the confluence of gender and sexual orientation, which interact to show
that harassment based on sexual orientation is, in essence, based on
gender. These two factors are intertwined and inseparable as aspects of
a person's identity. Solely arguing sex stereotyping, without a gender
deviance interpretation, results in an arbitrary decision as seen in
Dillon, as compared to the decision reached in Price Waterhouse.

Imagine the following hypothetical based upon the facts of Price
Waterhouse regarding the tenuous line between gender and sexual
orientation discrimination.2 44 After being asked to "walk more
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely... [and] wear
make-up," how would a court interpret Hopkins' superiors telling her
to "stop being such a dyke?" 245 It is likely that courts, dealing with
both gender and sexual orientation harassment, would continue to
resort to arbitrary conjectures resulting in further inconsistency or
speculation.
Although a plaintiff may have a mixed-motive claim based on
"gender plus" sexual orientation discrimination, the problem arises
when the harassing conduct is only viewed as limited to animus toward
homosexuals. Sexual harassment in the workplace against openly
"out" homosexual males at work is a form of employer-sanctioned
"gay-bashing., 246 A person who is targeted because of his sexual
orientation is also targeted as a man who does not measure up to the
standards of being a masculine heterosexual. Taunting a woman for
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

See Dillon v. Frank, 1992 WL 5436 (6th Cir.).
See id.
See id.
See Schultz, supra note 148, at 1785.
See id.
See id. The phrase "being out" means being a known homosexual.
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being a lesbian or for acting like one is similarly assailing her on the
basis of her gender, irrespective of her actual sexual orientation, as
seen in Price Waterhouse.24 7 Just because a hostile work environment
is the result of homosexual slurs does not mean that the anti-gay
expression is strictly confined to sexual orientation, devoid of any
line between sex and sexual orientation
gender motivation.T248
discrimination meets and remains at a connected point.
E.

Immutable or Not

Some legal scholars argue that it is unfair to discriminate against a
person on the basis of immutable characteristics, such as race, gender,
or sexual orientation.2 49 Immutability, however, has been liberally
construed to include the facial hair on African-American men who
cannot remove their beard due to PBF skin disease. 250 For those
suffering from PBF, hair removal would result in substantial difficulty,
cost, or pain to the victims.
The immutability theory of sexual orientation does not operate in
vacuum. A person's race is only immutable to the extent
social
a
society accords it recognition.2 5 1 Scientific data, though not completely
conclusive, suggest that homosexuality is biologically determined, and
the influence of a person's biology and environment would make it
extremely difficult for an individual to alter his/her sexual
orientation. 252 Assuming that sexual orientation is not immutable, as
some judges so conclude, there is the possibility for self-identified
heterosexual men to engage in male-on-male sexual activities, which
might trigger the sexual desire analysis in same-sex sexual harassment.
In this context, lines drawn based on sexual orientation are futile,
because self-identified "heterosexual" males would actually enjoy
sexual interaction with other males. In this scenario, it would be
impossible to distinguish the occurrences wherein the harassing
conduct would constitute sex or sexual orientation discrimination.

Sexual desire,

therefore, hardly resolves the difficulty in

247. See id.
248. See id at 1776.
249. See Andrew Koppelman, Three Arguments For Gay Rights, 95 MICH. L. REv.
1636, 1638 (1997).
250. See Bradley v. Pizzaco, 7 F.3d 795, 796 (8th Cir. 1993).
251. See OMI, supra note 176.
252. See id
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delineating harassing conduct as grounded in either sex or sexualorientation discrimination. Ideally sexual desire analysis should be
limited to use only in situations where a harasser acts with clear sexual
desire for his victim. Using a sexual desire analysis in most situations,
without clear discriminatory intent of that desire-which invariably
and infrequently occurs--does little to resolve this dilemma.
Immutable or not, even if a person could change his sexual
orientation in either direction, discriminating against a person who
feels sexually connected to members of the same sex seems to be an
irrational explanation for permitting employers to tolerate a hostile
work environment. Some believe that homosexuality is immutable,
and not a preferred option, because no rational person chooses to suffer
severe harassment and discrimination.
Homosexuals face daily bombardments by heterosexual standards
for relationships, and there is an intense pressure to conform to
pervasive heterosexual social norms.
Being surrounded by
heterosexual demonstrations of affection, many homosexuals still
believe that their sexual identity is unalterable.253 With the general
consensus among Americans that discrimination against sexual
minorities is wrong and irrational,254 a person who is performing well
above an employer's expectations should not be terminated or
253. Not eloquently stated, but with clear, unmistakable clarity, one teenager realized
that despite being surrounded by heterosexual affection and love, as on television, in the
movies, and from family members and friends, it took him "many years to accept-not

choose, but accept-his sexuality," until he finally realized that "if everything I saw, heard,
and went through didn't make me [a] straight [heterosexual], then I finally realized my
being gay wasn't going to change. And then it hit me: why should I change? I'm a good
person the way I am." See Marcossan, supra note 169, at 716 (2001).
254. In a recent Newsweek poll, 84% of the American public supports the elimination of
employment discrimination against homosexuals. In addition to the government, many
major corporations, such as AT&T, Eastman Kodak, Microsoft, RJR Nabisco, Quaker Oats,
and Xerox, have endorsed legislation against unfair employment practices that target sexual
minorities. Support for the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) can also be
found in several religious circles. See the National Council of Churches, National Catholic
Conference for Interracial Justice, the Union American Hebrew Congregations, and the
Southern Christian Leadership, at http://www.aclu.org/issues/gay/endatest.html (last visited,
Jan. 15, 2002). See also Human Rights Campaign, HRC Hails New Gallup Poll Showing
Continuing Positive Trends in US. Public Opinion In Some Gay Issues (June 4, 2001),
available at http://www.hrc.org/newsreleases/2001/010604gallup.asp (last visited Jan. 15,
2002). See also Jonathan Kastner & Leslie-Anne Hinton, Trends in Public Opinion on
Issues of Homosexuality, University of Vermont's Legislative Research Shop (March 2,
2000) (discussing 2000 Fox News/Opinion Dynamics Poll where 89% of 902 registered
voters answered yes to the question of whether "the Government should treat homosexuals
and heterosexuals equally" in terms of job opportunities), available at
http://www.uvm.edu/-vlrs/doc/publicopin-on-homosexuality.htm (last visited, Jan. 26,
2002).
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constructively forced to resign due to ensuing sexual harassment
unrelated to his diligence and performance as an employee. 255
Regardless of whether "the exact origins of sexual desire are
unknown, there is consensus that a person's sexual orientation,
homosexual or heterosexual, cannot be changed by a simple decisionmaking process... Thus, sexual orientation per se is not a
characteristic over which an individual has had any responsibility
acquiring. 256
Working in an atmosphere where same-sex sexual harassment is
tolerated, a male victim will have difficulty achieving success in his
career. In the case of women like Ann Hopkins in Price Waterhouse,
the corporate system designed with gender stereotypes puts
professional women who fail or refuse to conform to those stereotypes
at a unfair disadvantage. 257 Whether the employer is conscious of such
practices, this system provides masculine men and feminine women an
easier path to success.

V.

PROPOSAL

This comment, as a general premise, is grounded in the belief that
harassing conduct is firmly imbedded in the notion that an often sexist
and homophobic socio-legal system permeates uneven and unequal
worker-employer relations. The power imbalance present in opposite
sex sexual harassment is just as real and difficult for any person being
harassed and victimized to challenge, regardless of whether it is
opposite or same-sex sexual harassment. The way through this
labyrinth of confusion in same-sex sexual harassment can be found by
focusing on the reasons for the causes of the confusion. In doing so,
any legislative change can serve to educate employers and employees
alike who are faced with same-sex sexual harassment. This will also
assist the courts in reviewing similar claims.

The legal structure as it currently stands is too quick to dismiss the
harassing conduct of "boys being boys. 25 8 The system needs to be
255. See discussion supra Part N.C.
256. Jonathan Pickhardt, Note, Choose or Lose: Embracing Theories of Choice in Gay
Rights Litigation Strategies, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921 (1998) (citing Amici Curiae brief of
Human Rights Campaign Fund et al., in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)).
257. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 272 (1989).
258. See, e.g., Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1376 (8th 1996). The district
court regarded the harassing conduct of these males as juvenile behavior, dismissing the
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deconstructed and reconceptualized as one in which targeting male
coworkers is treated differently from harassment on the basis of
gender. In predominantly male environments, such as working among
fellow mechanics in Goluszek, or Hopkins working in an accounting
firm in Price Waterhouse, adherence to a system that harms another
person on the basis of sexual orientation, or perceived sexual
orientation, should form the basis of gender discrimination. The
gender element necessary in discrimination law is that gender is
connected to a person's sexual orientation. It is imperative for the
courts and legislature to recognize this interconnectivity and effectuate
steps to remedy this problem.
A.

Toward Recognizing Same-Sex Sexual Harassmentas Sex
Discrimination
Both the legislature and the judiciary should especially be
concerned with defining the boundaries wherein sex and sexual
orientation coexist. Given that a person's sexual orientation is so
deeply connected to his or her sex that there is no meaningful way to
divorce the two, courts should reevaluate their position of allowing
male harassers to go unpunished for creating a hostile work
environment. The line of demarcation between homosexuality and
gender can more clearly be seen through gender deviance and the sex
stereotyping theory as in Price Waterhouse.
The potential arbitrariness in statutory interpretation may result in
numbing the effectiveness of Title VII in meeting its purpose-to
eradicate employment discrimination and create a safe working
environment for everyone, men and women alike.2 59 In litigating samesex sexual harassment and considering the incentive for parties to
portray alleged harassment in the light most favorable to their
respective side, it is important for Congress to legislate manageable
standards to eliminate the confusion in same-sex sexual harassment
claims.
B.

Statutory Revision

States such as California have fixed the statutory gaps in Title VII
through their states' respective anti-discrimination statutes. The Fair
Employment and Housing Act should prompt Congress to recognize
male-on-male sexual harassment as harmless on this basis. See id.
259. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
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the need to correct the void that other states perceive as a problem. In
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the amorphous "because of sex" standard
needs clarification, especially as same-sex sexual6 harassment is
considered an actionable claim of sex discrimination.2 0
Congress did not initially provide the courts any guidance as to
how to interpret the words "because of sex." With the rise of same-sex
sexual harassment claims, the need for statutory revision becomes
apparent. Particularly noteworthy, Congresswoman Green cautioned
against writing "because of sex" into Title VII without any discussion
of the consequences. 26 1 Approximately half of a decade later, it is time
for the discussion of "because of sex" as it applies to same-sex sexual
harassment, in light of this comment's analysis of the confusion in the
federal courts. As other problems in Title VII have surfaced and been
ameliorated by subsequent legislative revisions, so too should same-sex
sexual harassment now be reexamined, when the courts have been far
from clear and consistent. To accomplish this goal successfully, any
revision must consider the missing piece in same-sex sexual
harassment jurisprudence-the interplay between sex and sexual
orientation.

C.

The Line of DemarcationBetween Sex and Sexual Orientation

Sex and sexual orientation are closely connected and often
simultaneously operative in same-sex sexual harassment. To delineate
when this occurs, the three scenarios discussed in Part II and IV should
assist the courts and legislature in fashioning judicial and legislative
standards. These three illustrations show when sexual orientation
coexist with gender: (1) references to a male's sexual prowess or lack
thereof could trigger Title VII; (2) comments directed at physical
behavior or effeminacy such as Sanchez carrying his waiter's tray "like
a woman" are rooted in stereotypes about how a man or woman should
act; (3) if the harasser insults the victim's clothes or accessories,
because they are typically associated with what a woman wears, that is
another sign that the harassment is motivated by gender.262 These facts
serve to assist the courts in interpreting how the harassment can
translate to gender-based discrimination. In addition, homosexual men
260. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Svcs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998).
261. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
262. This example was seen in the Doe v. City of Belleville case, involving harassment
of the teenager for wearing an earring. See 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997).
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perceived as inferior or inadequate may fit any of these illustrations.
D.

Presumptionthat the HarassmentIs Because of Sex

Unless the harassment is clearly attributable to animus toward
homosexuals, the only solution for the court is to include a rebuttable
presumption that the harassment fits within Title VII "because of sex."
As a rebuttable presumption, the employer would be given an
opportunity to present facts and evidence challenging such claims
should they lack merit.
Under this framework, the harasser could not escape liability by
showing that he targeted his victim because of effeminacy, which is
connected to gender stereotypes in violation of Title VII. Instead, the
harasser would need to make a showing that he has always tormented
homosexuals, and will continue to harass plaintiff for reasons other
than those related to gender.

V. CONCLUSION
Sexual desire, as a direct origin of opposite-sex sexual
harassment, is an inappropriate standard to resolve the confusion in
same-sex sexual harassment. The line of demarcation between sex and
sexual orientation discrimination becomes blurred by the use of sexual
desire.
As the ultimate objective of Title VII is to remove unnecessary
and arbitrary barriers to employment, 263 a person should not be
hindered from work because the employer harasses or condones
coworkers' harassment of an employee. Whether a person is male or
female, masculine or feminine, heterosexual or homosexual, sexual
harassment should not deny equal opportunity to work free from
physical and verbal abuse.264
From race to pregnancy, to determine who falls under the category
of a protected class, the courts, through subsequent legislation or by
means of judicial interpretation, have given Title VII a common sense
meaning. Since confusion continues to cloud the courts' review of
gender and sexual-orientation based harassment, ignoring the
intricacies of sexual orientation inherent in gender dynamics will only
further vex our judicial system and worsen this complex problem.
263. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
264. See Schultz, supra note 148, at 1796.

